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Motivated by the relative lack of open source analysis of China’s testing of missile 
interceptors since 2010, we decided to investigate the potential strategic implications for the 
United States and its allies if China continued to develop strategic ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) and then deployed even a limited strategic BMD system. During late 2014 and the 
first half of 2015, we had discussions with more than 50 experts (including about two dozen 
Chinese officials, military officers, and academics) in China and the United States. Based on 
these discussions, our study of the literature, our examination of potential incentives and 
disincentives for China’s BMD development and deployment, and prior experience in 
studying BMD issues, we have observed:  
 
 None of the Chinese we spoke with attempted to “explain away” Chinese activities 
in strategic BMD developments. While several Chinese explained this work as only 
intended to gain technological insight, Chinese views on strategic BMD have 
appeared to shift in recent years toward receptivity of development and even 
possible deployment.  
 
 Chinese experts expressed acceptance and understanding about the connection 
between strategic BMD and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Indeed, several Chinese 
experts stated that Chinese ASAT activity is necessary for technical readiness and in 
order to understand what the United States and other nations could do in this field.  
 
 The Chinese government is discussing whether to deploy some level of strategic 
BMD but no decisions (at least publicly) have been announced as of yet. Such a 
decision would have to be made at very senior levels.  
 
 Importantly, any likely level of Chinese strategic BMD deployment would have very 
little effect on U.S. strategic forces, given the size and technological advancement of 
U.S. nuclear weapon systems. Nonetheless, the United States would most likely have 
to respond to U.S. domestic political concerns and U.S. allies’ seeking reassurances, 
which may necessitate deploying possible countermeasures as a demonstration of 
U.S. commitment to maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent.   
 
While we provide an in-depth analysis in the body of the report, we summarize our main 
findings here:  
 
 Chinese development of strategic BMD is ongoing and is helping China to 
understand the complexities and nuances of designing such a system and what its 
weak points are, regardless of whether they decide to deploy such a BMD system. 
Also, this development provides an important hedging option for China against an 
uncertain and evolving future strategic environment.  
 
 At a minimum, it appears that a Chinese deployment of strategic BMD is probably 
less unlikely than most U.S. defense analysts have in the past assessed. 
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 Should China decide to deploy such defenses, the most likely reasons would be to: 
 
 Provide a plausible cover to continue testing its kinetic energy ASAT       
system.  This suggests that a thin, regional/nationwide defense would be 
more likely than a point defense, though the latter cannot be ruled out.  Point 
defense would not provide much cover for an ASAT testing program. 
 Send a strategic message to India, Japan, and the United States, in that order, 
that China is capable of defending itself and overcoming major technical 
obstacles to do so. 
 Obtain important operational understanding of BMD systems for their own 
use and to better understand the systems that others may have or may 
develop. 
 Enhance its regional prestige and sway, gaining a “technological merit badge” 
of recognition for achieving such a difficult technological task 
 
 Should China decide to deploy strategic BMD, limited deployment levels appear to 
be more likely than larger levels, given the relatively high cost for a large system; 
furthermore, even were it to ultimately deploy larger levels, China would want to gain 
more experience in what (for them) would be a new class of weapons. 
 
 The incremental cost to China of a limited deployment of strategic BMD as part of 
its overall R&D program would probably be modest compared to the security 
benefits China would receive, even taking some political drawbacks into account. 
Accordingly, the odds are fairly good that China will make at least a limited 
deployment of strategic BMD in the near- to mid-term, though this is not certain.  
   
 To the extent that any U.S. programmatic changes would be needed for political 
reassurance reasons, there are a number of options available to the United States, 
particularly in strategic BMD penetration aids and enhancements to the bomber leg 
of the triad, which should suffice. The United States would likely have no technical 
reason to make any significant adjustments to its strategic posture in response to 
plausible levels of Chinese strategic BMD deployments, should they take place. The 
U.S. strategic nuclear posture and forces are robust and are able to deal with such 
deployments.  
 
 A Chinese move to deploy early warning satellites would be a significant indicator of 
greater interest in strategic BMD deployment, as it would be a crucial component of 
an effective strategic BMD system. Such satellites would not be necessary for a 











China has received growing attention over the last ten years for its activity in modernizing 
and expanding its strategic offensive nuclear forces, both land- and sea-based developments 
and deployments.1 At the same time, little attention has been paid to Chinese activities in 
developing ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Since the conclusion of the Cold War, if not 
earlier, U.S. security policy has seemed to tacitly assume that only the United States would 
possess credible strategic ballistic missile defense capabilities with non-nuclear interceptors. 
Russia’s nuclear-tipped interceptors’ BMD defenses against U.S. strategic ballistic missiles 
atrophied as the Soviet Union fell apart and were not accorded much strategic significance. 
This tacit assumption of a U.S. strategic BMD monopoly underlying U.S. policy has been 
effective for the last quarter century in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, it may not 
remain valid for much longer.  Chinese development, testing, and possible deployment of 
strategic BMD may upset U.S. thinking about missile defense and stimulate new policies and 
approaches in this area. 
 
For a number of years, China has been exploring and developing BMD capabilities to defend 
against a spectrum of ballistic missile challenges, from short-range missiles to ballistic 
missiles with intercontinental ranges. [China’s earliest exploration of missile defense 
occurred more than 50 years ago, as discussed later in this report.] According to the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), “China has made efforts … to gain a BMD capability in 
order to provide further protection of China’s mainland and strategic assets.” Of particular 
interest for this study, DOD continues to employ language similar to that which it has used 
for several years to describe China’s strategic BMD efforts: “China is proceeding with the 
research and development of a missile defense umbrella consisting of a kinetic energy 
intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes (greater than 80 km), as well as intercepts of ballistic 
missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere. In January 2010 and 
again in January 2013, China successfully intercepted a ballistic missile at mid-course, using a 
ground-based missile.”2 Although the Chinese military does not normally say much about its 
BMD programs, China did publicly announce that it conducted ground-based mid-course 
BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014 (although the United States believes the 2014 test was 
actually a test of an anti-satellite system rather than a BMD test).3 This BMD-ASAT 
connection will be discussed in more depth later in this report. Chinese state media describes 
                                                        
1 Steps China has taken include deployments of the road-mobile DF-31A intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM), development and likely future deployment of the longer-range DF-41 ICBM, Jin-
class missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) and associated JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs), deployment of multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on its older 
DF-5 ICBM and possible deployment on the DF-41, and other associated developments. Notably, 
the deployment of the DF-31A first took place in 2006, and the most recent Defense Department’s 
report notes that China has begun MIRVing the older DF-5 ICBM and possibly the much newer D-
41. See: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Department of Defense, April 7, 2015. 
2 Ibid., p. 34. 
3 Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and 
Compliance, “Ensuring the Long-Term Sustainability and Security of the Space Environment,” 
Speech at the U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, Omaha, Nebraska, August 13, 2014, 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/230611.htm 
 6 
all these tests as BMD tests that are defensive in nature and are not targeted at any country.4 
One noteworthy feature of these Chinese statements about their BMD intercept tests is the 
fact that they were made public at all. China is typically quite secretive about its weapons 
tests, especially its strategic weapons tests. For example, the world was recently informed 
that China has begun putting multiple warheads on its DF-5 silo-based ICBMs (though this 
information came from the U.S. Defense Department annual report on Chinese Military 
Power, not from China itself). Regardless, this still makes the Chinese announcements about 
these BMD intercept tests quite noteworthy. The authors were told by knowledgeable 
Chinese that the habit of not releasing such information has been so ingrained over decades 
in internal Chinese policy that it just is not done under normal circumstances (though this 
may eventually change). A major reason why BMD is such a striking exception is likely due 
to the extraordinarily bad press and worldwide condemnation China experienced in 
conjunction with its 2007 ASAT test, which was not explained by China until well after the 
United States revealed information about the test shortly after it happened. The Chinese 
statements also allow China to characterize their tests as they would like,  for example, 
describing an ASAT test as a BMD test, which is far less controversial. This issue is 
discussed later in the report. 
 
At the very least, this suggests that China has an ongoing interest in strategic ballistic missile 
defense, if only to understand the technology to a much greater extent. Given China’s 
substantially increasing aerospace and defense capabilities, its growing assertiveness on the 
world stage, and its understandable desire to be respected for its broadening economic and 
military capabilities, the authors believe that it is important to identify and assess: 
 
1. Possible incentives and disincentives China faces in considering development and 
deployment (D&D) of strategic BMD capabilities; 
 
2. Plausible D&D scenarios and missions; 
 
3. The security implications of these scenarios for the United States and its allies; and 
 
4. Options for the United States going forward. 
 
This study is mostly agnostic regarding the question of D&D of Chinese strategic BMD. 
However, it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility and remain unprepared for what 
could be a significant new development in a dimension of the strategic environment that, for 
the past 25 years, the United States has heretofore had largely to itself.  The series of 
strategic BMD tests that China has conducted in the past five years alone should compel the 
United States and its allies to be alert to this important possibility and encourage closer 
examination of China’s possible motivations and objectives.   
 
Study Methodology. There have been three broad interacting components to this study:  
First was to posit possible incentives and disincentives for China to develop and deploy 
strategic ballistic missile defense; Second was to meet with Chinese and U.S. experts to 
                                                        
4 Assistant Secretary of State Frank A. Rose, speaking at an FAS-hosted workshop, Washington, 
D.C., February 20, 2015; see Appendix A-1 for full text of his speech.  
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discuss these issues and seek their thoughts on China and strategic BMD; And finally, the 
authors and colleagues assessed the implications for U.S. security interests for each of the 
scenarios examined. In pursuit of these objectives, meetings and discussions were conducted 
with numerous experts from defense agencies, militaries, think tanks, embassies, and 
universities in Beijing and Shanghai in China; Washington, DC; Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
and Hanover, New Hampshire. The New England meetings were concentrated at 
Dartmouth College, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University; a 
separate day-long workshop was held at FAS headquarters in Washington, DC. In total, we 
spoke with more than 50 experts over the course of this study, all of whom provided 








































Previous Chinese Research and Development on Strategic BMD 
 
While the academic literature is overflowing with 20+ years’ worth of Chinese experts’ 
concerns over U.S. BMD development and deployment, there is scant information available 
about China’s research and development on its own BMD systems (prior to the Chinese 
BMD test in January 2010). China’s serious exploration of BMD dates back at least to 1964. 
Iain Johnston, a leading non-Chinese scholar of China, notes that soon after China’s first 
nuclear test explosion in 1964, Chairman Mao Zedong ordered “the start of a long-term 
BMD research program. According to one of the engineers involved in this program, China 
spent around $100 million on the program through to around 1977.”5 This program was 
code-named the “640 Program” due to its having commenced in 1964 as the first major 
defense R&D program of that year. Mark Stokes, an American analyst who closely monitors 
Chinese military developments, noted that “under the 640 Program, the space and missile 
industry’s Second Academy, traditionally responsible for SAM [surface-to-air missile] 
development, set out to field a viable antimissile system, consisting of a kinetic kill vehicle, 
high-powered laser, space early warning, and target discrimination system components.”6 
Despite this ambitious agenda for the 640 Program, it fell well short of having a feasible 
BMD system. In particular, according to Evan Medeiros, a leading U.S. expert on China, 
nonproliferation, and arms control, there was “a team of 8-10 scientists … [who] conducted 
multiple feasibility studies on development of missile defense systems. This work roughly 
paralleled extensive U.S. and Soviet R&D efforts on missile defense prior to the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Yet China’s program achieved few successes due to the high 
technological barriers and China’s relative backwardness. Deng Xiaoping cancelled the 
program in 1983.”7 Deng also shifted China’s grand strategy from recurring revolutionary 
upheaval (as practiced by Chairman Mao) to emphasizing economic development (while still 
modernizing China’s military).8 Of the “Four Modernizations” enacted under Deng, military 
modernization was clearly #4 in priority, behind agriculture, industry, and science and 
technology. With China already spending 7-10 percent of its GDP on the military, the 
defense modernization called for in implementing the Ten Year Plan would have cost an 
additional $300 billion, an excessive amount that was thus dropped.9  An expensive missile 
defense program at that time would have detracted from Deng’s admonition that “to get rich 
is glorious” for China. 
 
                                                        
5 A. I. Johnston, “Some Thoughts on Chinese Nuclear Deterrence,” discussion paper prepared for a 
workshop on Chinese military doctrine at the CNA Corporation, February 2, 2000, as quoted in Brad 
Roberts, “China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond,” IDA Paper P-3826, 
Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003, p. 7. 
6 Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: 
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 1999), p. 118.  
7 Evan Medeiros, “Integrating a Rising Power Into Global Nonproliferation Regimes: US-China 
Negotiations and Interactions on Nonproliferation, 1980-2001,” unpublished dissertation 
manuscript, p. 245. Medeiros notes, “there is no published data on China’s ABM efforts in the 1970s. 
This information is based on several conversations with Wu Zhan, a missile engineer who 
participated in the program,” footnote 4 of the reference, as quoted in Roberts (2003).  
8 Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-first Century (New 
York: Random House, 2014), chapter 11. 
9 John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, “Beijing’s Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export 
Enigma,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 87-109. 
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But soon after Deng stopped the 640 Program, China’s leadership still had to understand the 
implications of the Reagan administration’s launch in 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI). Due to Deng’s and other Chinese leaders’ efforts to open up China to the outside 
world, the number of research institutes and experts in China specializing in security studies 
was growing dramatically. The SDI program stimulated considerable debate within this 
Chinese research community. In particular, Premier Zhao Ziyang directed this community to 
study the implications of SDI.10 The views ranged from some experts (especially those in the 
Chinese military) who believed that SDI could be stabilizing as a “deterrent of deterrents” to 
others who were concerned that it was a harbinger of the United States seeking to become 
militarily dominant.11 Many Chinese security analysts expressly worried about the potential 
effect on China’s relatively small number of nuclear-armed ICBMs and specifically on the 
possibility that SDI could give the United States the capability to launch a disarming first 
strike.  
 
As this internal Chinese domestic debate developed, the Chinese government “began to 
draw a distinction between the deployment of such systems, to which it remained opposed, 
and research, to which it was no longer averse.”12 Moreover, Chinese officials wanted to 
avoid falling behind the Americans and Soviets and thought that there could be valuable 
spinoff technologies to the Chinese economy from an R&D program on BMD.13 By 1986, 
Chinese officials were acknowledging that China “along with many others, is carrying out a 
great deal of research into defense against nuclear weapons.”14 A Chinese scholar assessed, 
“with growing interest, especially in the mid-1980s, the Chinese have already begun 
conceiving the development and even the eventual deployment of their own space-based 
deterrent, or star wars system. The Chinese defense specialists, unlike their Western 
counterparts, have consistently expressed a positive attitude toward the feasibility and 
desirability of acquiring such a system.”15  
 
The R&D program, initiated by COSTIND, the PLA commission managing China’s defense 
industries, was known by the code name “863 Program” (due to its having started in March 
1986) and involved 18 critical technologies with the overall objective of modernizing the 
PLA.16 In 1999, Mark Stokes identified that four prominent defense engineers presented a 
petition in March 1986 to the Central Committee and that:  
                                                        
10 Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett, “Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative,” Problems of Communism, Vol. 35 (March-April 1986), p. 30. 
11 See references and analysis in Roberts (2003) pp. 11-12. 
12 China’s Evolving Arms Control Policy, an anonymously authored summary prepared for the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), FB87-10018, September 30, 1987, p. 10, as cited in Roberts 
(2003).  
13 Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett, “SDI and China’s National Interest,” paper presented to 
a conference on SDI: Implications for the Asian Community, Seoul, Korea, July 29-31, 1986, as 
referenced in Roberts (2003). 
14 Alastair I. Johnston, “China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s,” 
Aurora Paper (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986), p. 75. 
15 Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 1988), pp. 40-41. 
16 Mark Stokes, “China’s Ballistic Missiles and East Asian Reaction to U.S. Missile Defense 
Initiatives,” pp. 128-129, in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, editors, China’s Growing Military 
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All of the engineers pushing the new initiative were involved in strategic 
programs—Wang Daheng, a preeminent optics expert who played a role in 
China’s space tracking network; Wang Ganchang, one of the founding 
fathers of China’s nuclear program; Yang Jiachi, a satellite attitude control 
expert; and Chen Fangyun, an electronics engineer and leader of the program 
to develop China’s space tracking network. The plan, referred to as the 863 
Program, was implemented in parallel to COSTIND’s Long Range Plan to 
Year 2000 and was jointly managed by COSTIND and the SSTC [State 
Science and Technology Commission]. The 863 Program, still a guide and 
funding source for numerous preliminary R&D projects, focuses on some of 
the same technologies included in the SDI and Europe’s answer to SDI, the 
Eureka Program, including space systems, high powered lasers, 
microelectronics, and automated control systems.17  
 
In 1991, China’s potential interest in BMD deployment waned; in January of that year, 
President George H. W. Bush decided to substantially downsize SDI to a much more 
modest program, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), and then, that December, 
the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Consequently, the threat of massive thermonuclear war 
reduced substantially and the potential risk to China’s nuclear deterrent from U.S. missile 
defense looked less threatening. But also in 1991, Chinese defense planners became 
concerned about the implications of the U.S. military’s precision strike weapons and the 
theater missile defense system demonstrated during the Gulf War. As a result of this 
demonstration, Taiwanese leaders and military officials became interested in acquiring 
theater missile defense systems as protection against missiles aimed at Taiwan from mainland 
China.18 PRC officials vehemently protested against such an acquisition and ordered a 
buildup of ballistic missiles that could strike Taiwan. Some Chinese defense analysts also 
believed that the United States had a strategy of leveraging missile defense in East Asia in 
order to contain China. 
 
While the United States remained committed to limited-scale strategic BMD development 
throughout most of the 1990s, the Clinton Administration came under increasing political 
pressure to move toward deployment and even to expand the scale of the notional BMD 
system, even though the ABM Treaty was (then) still in effect and thus placed significant 
constraints on the scale of deployment. The tipping point came in August 1998 when North 
Korea launched a long-range Taepodong missile with the ostensible purpose of placing a 
satellite in orbit. Although the launch failed in its ultimate mission of satellite placement, the 
missile itself appeared to jolt the U.S. intelligence community due to its three stages. Further, 
this launch had auspicious timing because of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States, which had issued its report on July 15, 1998, underscoring 
how missile threats had been underestimated and that the U.S. intelligence community had 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, September 2002). 
17 Mark A. Stokes (September 1999), pp. 11-12. 
18 Wei-Chin Lee, “Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense,” The Nonproliferation 
Review, Fall 2001. 
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not been adequately tracking these developments.19 The North Korean missile launch 
appeared to confirm this assessment.  
 
Soon after this launch, the United States decided to invest more in regional and national 
missile defense systems. Yet even before this high-profile occurrence, China had already 
been ramping up its development of missile defense, beginning in the mid-1990s. Its R&D 
program to defeat U.S. missile defense programs focused on counter-surveillance and 
counter-intercept technologies. The former included electronic countermeasures, stealthy 
decoys, and fast burn motors, while the latter involved multiple warheads and maneuvering 
reentry vehicles. Also in the mid-1990s, the Central Military Commission “approved funding 
for a 10-year development program for a missile defense system, to include satellites for 
missile launch warning. The PLA Air Force and the Chinese Aerospace Corporation 
advocated a 15-year, three-phase approach to missile defense. The first step is to field a 
‘Patriot-like’ system, such as the HQ-9, followed by research and development of an 
extended range interceptor modeled on the PAC-3 missile, and basic conceptual research on 
a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]-like mid-course intercept system.”20 It is 
important to point out that China was focusing in the mid-1990s on theater missile defense 
(TMD)-type systems and that the shift in U.S. priorities after 1998 toward larger scale national 
missile defense (NMD) took Beijing by surprise. In January 1999, then-Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen announced that the United States would invest more in both TMD and 























                                                        
19 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the 
United States, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, July 15, 1998. 
20 Stokes, “China’s Ballistic Missiles and East Asian Reaction to U.S. Missile Defense Initiatives,” p. 
129. 
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Chinese Reactions toward U.S. Strategic BMD 
 
A number of Chinese academics emphasized to us that China has followed a decades-long 
pattern: (1) Chinese arms control officials and political leaders strongly denounce U.S. 
deployment of strategic BMD; (2) in parallel, China devotes financial and technical resources 
toward R&D to understand the nature of the U.S. system; (3) if Beijing’s rhetoric does not 
have the intended effect of convincing the United States to cease deployment, China can 
accelerate a limited ongoing BMD development program; and (4) if the U.S. deployment 
appears increasingly threatening to China’s nuclear deterrent, Chinese senior leadership can 
then decide, weighing many factors, whether or not to move forward with deployment of its 
own BMD system, (which would likely be limited in scale).    
 
Sixteen years ago, the Chinese government launched a vigorous effort to denounce U.S. 
BMD. In particular, the shift in U.S. missile defense policy in 1999 revved up China’s arms 
control diplomatic corps into high gear. Ambassador Sha Zukang, then Director General of 
China’s newly created Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, seemed to be omnipresent and indefatigable in making China’s arguments 
against strategic BMD. Ambassador Sha deployed four main arguments:21   
 
1. Strategic BMD would present a direct threat to China’s nuclear deterrent especially 
when a certain country (that is, the United States) would then have both potent 
“swords” (nuclear warheads) and “shields” (BMD). Li Bin, a prominent Chinese 
academic of Tsinghua University, made the argument at that time that “deterrence 
would be compromised once American policymakers believed that NMD could 
defend the United States against a Chinese nuclear attack, even if it could not actually 
do so.”22 A 2014 review by two U.S.-based experts of the Chinese defense literature, 
as well as interviews conducted by these experts in China, underscored that this 
perceived threat remains the top concern.23 
 
2. BMD would undermine international nuclear arms control and strategic stability. In 
particular, Chinese leaders discredited the U.S. position on NMD deployment and 
the ABM Treaty, arguing that the treaty was a pillar of international stability. In July 
2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a 
joint statement in support of not modifying the ABM Treaty.  
 
3. In a related argument, BMD would halt nuclear disarmament, stimulate further 
missile proliferation, and spur an arms race in outer space. Chinese officials and 
analysts explained that a significant BMD deployment by the United States would 
logically lead to a Russian interest in at least maintaining its large number of ballistic 
missiles and even result in a further buildup. Other states would also have incentive 
                                                        
21 See Roberts (2003) for a more detailed exposition, pp. 23-26. 
22 Quoted in Zhu Mingquan, “U.S. Plans on National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD): A Chinese Perspective,” The Monitor, Center for International Trade and Security, 
Winter-Spring 1999. 
23 Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Capabilities and Crises: The Future of U.S.-China 
Strategic Stability,” Paper prepared for Nuclear Studies Research Initiative Conference, Airlie Center, 
Virginia, April 30—May 3, 2015. 
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to follow suit according to the Chinese assessment. As an exemplar of the view that 
too much strategic BMD can be destabilizing, a leading Chinese arms control 
scholar, Sun Xiangli, wrote in 2010: “Historically, limitations on the development of 
strategic missile defense systems were a cornerstone of nuclear arms control. The 
development of strategic missile defense not only easily facilitates nuclear arms 
racing; it poisons relations between the nuclear nations, destroys strategic stability, 
and makes deep nuclear reductions difficult to realize.”24 
 
4. Finally, BMD would contribute to the United States becoming the dominant political 
and military power. Chinese experts worried that the United States was seeking 
“absolute security” and would weaken or eviscerate other states’ security.  
Ambassador Sha went so far as to argue that BMD would feed the U.S. tendency 
toward unilateralism and its pursuit of a preemptive strategy. A related concern was 
that U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan would embolden them. 
Beijing explicitly worried about U.S. missile defense technology transfer to Japan that 
could then be applied to Japanese manufacture of offensive missiles.  
 
Presently, China’s main concerns about U.S. BMD are not so much over what U.S. 
capabilities are today as they are about what they could be in the future, as well as the 
possible strategic spill-over effects of U.S. TMD capabilities deployed in East Asia. The U.S. 
system known as THAAD is of particular concern, primarily concerning its X-band radar, 
which China sees as having the potential for cuing U.S.-based strategic BMD, allowing the 
44 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors to be more effective in defeating a 
Chinese retaliatory strike. The authors have heard these concerns repeatedly expressed by 
their Chinese interlocutors in both the United States and China. China appears to 
understand the U.S. rationale for a defense against North Korea, but is worried that the 
United States may increase the number of interceptors deployed and/or the capabilities of its 
interceptors. In dialogue with Chinese experts, they point out that China is only modestly 
increasing its numbers of warheads, and that they must not only have retaliatory forces to 
address the United States, but made reference to strategic needs vis-à-vis Russia as well.  
Strategic stability is a major Chinese concern, and China is worried that U.S. strategic BMD 
will upset strategic stability if it increases beyond current levels. 
 
In addition to vigorous diplomatic demarches in multiple arenas, China has responded to 
U.S. missile defense developments by investing more in countermeasures, such as field 
testing the road-mobile DF-31A ICBM, modernizing its nuclear command and control 
system, and increasing the proportion of its nuclear force dedicated to targeting the United 
States.25 Notably, in August 1999, the Central Committee approved the “998 Project” that 
renewed China’s R&D for technologies that could support an eventual deployment of 
Chinese BMD. It is important to emphasize that this project involved many weapons 
technologies, not just BMD, that could give China asymmetric countermeasures, especially in 
                                                        
24 Sun Xiangli, “Zhongguo junking de xin tiaozhan yu xin yi-cheng (New Challenges and New 
Agendas for Chinese Arms Control),” Beijing: Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, as translated by Gregory 
Kulacki. 
25 Roberts (2003) and references therein, p. 30. 
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response to the U.S. revolution in military affairs. The project has also been known as the 
“Assassin’s Mace Program.”26 
 
Several Chinese scholars who are affiliated with prominent academic institutions have 
assessed how China could respond to the challenges of U.S. strategic BMD.27 These analysts 
have largely agreed with each other as to what China could do. The options include using 
countermeasures, such as decoys and chaff; deploying more ICBMs; placing MIRVs on these 
ICBMs; deploying more mobile ICBMs; and building more SSBNs and making sure that 
enough are deployed at sea. On the other hand, they are mindful (as a group) of China’s “No 
First Use Policy” and the international perception of China. That is, they would not want 
China and the United States to engage in a heated arms race. However, they agree that China 
must have an assured nuclear deterrent retaliatory force. Notably, these scholars tend to 
prefer that China choose relatively low cost countermeasures as much as possible. Hui 
Zhang, physicist and arms control analyst, has described in detail the potential passive 
countermeasures against U.S. missile defense:  
 
Boost phase countermeasures:  
 
 Reducing the boost time using fast-burn booster 
 Lofting or depressing the ICBM trajectories 
 Spoofing the defender’s tracking sensors 
 Simultaneously launching several ICBMs (or with some theater or tactical 
ballistic missiles) from a compact area 
 Protecting the missile body with reflective or ablative coatings 
 Rotating the missile 
 
Midcourse phase countermeasures: 
 
 Using reentry vehicle (RV)-simulating decoys and chaff to hide the RV from 
BMD radars 
 Using anti-simulation techniques to make the RV radar image look like one 
among many balloons 
 Reducing the radar signature of the warhead 
 Reducing the infrared signature of the warhead 
 
Terminal phase countermeasures: 
 
 Making the high-velocity warhead maneuverable28 
 
                                                        
26 See: Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 
50-51, and references therein. 
27 For example, see the published writings of Shen Dingli, Li Bin, Wu Riqiang, and Hui Zhang.  
28 Hui Zhang, “Chinese Perceptions on Space Weapons,” Chapter 2 in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, 
Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of 
Arts & Sciences, 2008), p. 56. 
 15 
Note that in his analysis, Zhang deemphasized China building up its missile forces. Prior to 
the January 2010 Chinese BMD test, Chinese academics tended to not publish articles about 
China’s potential development and deployment of BMD. As noted earlier in this report, 
non-Chinese scholars (particularly a select few American experts) were examining this issue, 
but they were largely skeptical of China’s capability to field a strategic BMD system. For 
example, Paul H.B. Godwin assessed in 2003:  
 
As with many advanced technology military programs, initial research programs are 
relatively inexpensive, especially when compared to developing and testing 
prototypes. Consequently, although China’s interest in an extensive range of 
technologies is evident, even if only for point defense of missile bases and command 
[and] control (C2) facilities, whether and when these research programs can be 
translated into operational systems are questionable. If U.S. missile defense programs 
are any measure, it will be many years before China can deploy effective missile 
defenses—and then, only after considerable investment.29 
 
Based on a literature review of Chinese writings and interviews conducted in 2013 and early 
2014 with Chinese experts, Gregory Kulacki, the China Project Manager with the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, assessed that “Chinese experimentation with missile defense 
technology is leading to a greater awareness of its limitations. This awareness, especially 
because it is a product of China’s own research, development, and testing, is reducing 
Chinese anxieties about the threat missile defense might present to Chinese missile forces, 
both nuclear and conventional.”30 Kulacki concluded that China would continue research 
and development but not necessarily move to deployment.  
 
There is widespread acceptance of the idea that China is seeking to better understand 
strategic BMD technology, even to the point of conducting strategic BMD developmental 
flight tests thus to better understand BMD technical issues confronting the United States. 
Among other benefits, this would help China design penetration aids and other 
countermeasures to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defenses. However, there is an 
unresolved issue of whether China’s need for better understanding of strategic BMD issues 
would extend to operational issues as well, from the technical to the mundane, which could 
be much better understood from actual deployment using actual military personnel, not 









                                                        
29 Paul H.B. Godwin, “Potential Chinese Responses to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” in Alan D. 
Romberg and Michael McDevitt, editors, China and Missile Defense: Managing U.S.-PRC Strategic 
Relations (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 69. 
30 Gregory Kulacki, “Chinese Concerns About U.S. Missile Defense,” Report for the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, July 2014. 
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Stability Dimensions of Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense 
 
In discussions with Chinese experts and government officials about strategic BMD, it does 
not take long for them to raise the subject of strategic stability. While they are well aware of 
the daunting technical challenges in developing and deploying an effective strategic BMD 
system, Chinese defense analysts also have great respect for U.S. technological prowess and 
past technical achievements. Despite repeated reassurances from the United States about its 
lack of interest in defending against a Chinese retaliatory strategic strike (China’s chief 
worry), China continues to be worried that the United States may achieve a strategic BMD 
technological breakthrough. At a minimum, China is concerned that the United States could 
improve its BMD capabilities, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to what would be 
sufficient to force China to undertake costly improvements to its strategic offensive 
capabilities (beyond those improvements it is already developing and deploying). The 
potential for an even more costly and unstable action-reaction cycle between U.S. defense 
and Chinese offense appears to underscore these Chinese concerns.  
 
China is apprehensive that the United States could attack and destroy much of its ICBM 
force and then rely on its missile defenses to defend against the ragged, much-diminished 
Chinese retaliatory response. In the last ten years, it appears that China has moved to address 
this core strategic problem, primarily by relying on an increase of ICBM warheads and 
deploying these added warheads on road-mobile DF-31A ICBMs to reduce their 
vulnerability, and, more recently, by MIRVing its silo-based Titan II-class (that is, earlier 
generation liquid-fuelled) DF-5 ICBMs. China has also begun strengthening its sea-based 
nuclear force capability, according to the Department of Defense. 
 
While China’s concerns about U.S. strategic BMD and potential strategic instability are often 
dismissed by the United States at both official and unofficial levels, these concerns are 
understandable (although exaggerated, at least to some extent). Given that China’s offensive 
nuclear forces are much smaller than those of Russia, any significant increase in U.S. 
strategic BMD could potentially have far greater impact on the credibility of the Chinese 
nuclear deterrent than it would have on Russia’s much larger deterrent force, and therefore 
likely result in worst-case contingency planning (as the United States does).  It is also 
important to recall that China does not have decades of experience in developing and testing 
strategic BMD countermeasures for its missile forces, unlike the United States and Russia 
(though it likely is working on such capabilities).  
 
China has taken a more forthright stance in the past 15 years against U.S. strategic BMD in 
the wake of the U.S. decision to deploy limited strategic missile defenses, despite Chinese 
conducting its own albeit lower-level research. This has also been the period when China has 
begun to expand its strategic offensive forces with the recent deployment of the DF-31A 
road-mobile ICBM, its Jin-class submarine launched ballistic missile and submarine, and DF-
41 ICBM development work. The timing of this deployment may simply be coincidental, or 
it may be related to U.S. missile defense activity. As the Perry-Schlesinger Congressional 




U.S. assessments indicate that a significant operational impact on the 
Chinese deterrent would require a larger and more capable defense 
than the United States has plans to construct, but China may already 
be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment 
of the U.S. missile defense program.31  
 
To gain a better appreciation for the dynamics of the U.S.-Chinese offense-defense 
interaction and how this may influence Chinese decision-making on strategic BMD and 
strategic modernization, it is important to recognize that U.S. confidence in, or Chinese 
anxiety about, strategic ballistic missile defense is not a zero-sum game, where decreased U.S. 
confidence in its strategic BMD leads directly to increased Chinese confidence in its ability 
to overcome those defenses. To the extent that U.S. confidence in its strategic BMD falls 
short of perfection, China’s (or another adversary’s) confidence in its ability to penetrate U.S. 
missile defenses does not increase by a corresponding amount, or anywhere near it.  This is because 
perceptions of possible BMD performance are, at least, as (if not more) important to 
deterrence than real capability, at least from a crisis planning perspective. And perceptions 
are strongly influenced by risk aversion. 
 
At the strategic nuclear level, risk aversion plays an essential role both in force-planning and 
crisis decision-making and, thus, also in deterrence. When considering nuclear weapons use, 
countries are typically strongly risk-averse. They often do not base their decisions on likely 
circumstances, but on unlikely (but usually still plausible) conditions. Given the longstanding 
U.S. reputation for technological accomplishment, it would be unwise for other countries to 
assume that U.S. missile defenses would not be effective. The United States demonstrated 
this same risk-averse approach when the Soviet Union deployed its missile defenses around 
Moscow in the late 1960s and seemed to be considering building more extensive missile 
defenses elsewhere in western Russia (these later turned out to be air defenses). Facing such 
a potential threat to its ability to retaliate against the Soviet Union, the United States invested 
in a variety of steps (MIRVing and penetration aid development, continued strategic 
modernization, etc.) to ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrent even against this “worst-
case” threat.  
 
A limited Chinese strategic BMD deployment could incrementally reassure China from a 
stability perspective because it could complicate any U.S. attempt to execute a counterforce 
attack against Chinese strategic nuclear forces. This effect would likely be minor, however, 
because of the much larger number of warheads the United States could allocate to attacking 
Chinese nuclear forces. 
 
For a country like China, risk aversion could well manifest itself as needing to ensure that it 
could effectively retaliate against a U.S. first strike, including taking U.S. strategic BMD into 
account. While current U.S. strategic BMD could not blunt a Chinese first strike, China 
could see this American BMD, in a risk-averse sort of way, as being potentially able to blunt 
a diminished Chinese retaliatory response to a U.S. first strike, especially if U.S. defenses 
were more capable than those deployed today. At the force-planning level, risk aversion 
                                                        
31 America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 
United States, William J. Perry, Chairman, and James R. Schlesinger, Vice Chairman (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 32. 
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exhibits potential destabilizing characteristics, and this appears to be what concerns China 
most about U.S. strategic BMD. The more confidence that a country like China has that this 
modest U.S. strategic BMD deployment will not increase, the less instability is introduced 
into the relationship.  
 
At the same time, there can be stabilizing dimensions to this instability in the case of North 
Korea. In spring 2013, North Korea engaged in unusually bellicose rhetoric against the 
United States, threatening nuclear attacks and other provocative actions, such as closing 
down the Kaesong industrial zone where South and North Korea cooperate in economic 
activity. As before, China claimed it could do little to persuade North Korea to discontinue 
its provocative behavior. In response to North Korea’s harsh rhetorical attacks and to 
reassure regional U.S. allies (as well as the American public), the United States flew B-2 and 
B-52 aircraft (which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons) over South Korea, sending a 
strong message not just to North Korea, but China as well. A number of days later, the 
United States also announced that it would deploy an additional 14 ground-based BMD 
interceptors in Alaska, a proportionate response to North Korea’s incendiary rhetoric that 
strengthened U.S. capabilities to defend against a North Korean attack against the United 
States.   
 
Almost immediately after this announcement of additional U.S. strategic BMD interceptor 
deployments, China reduced North Korea’s access to hard currency banking in China, 
imposing an important new crimp on the North Korean economy. In just a few days, 
Pyongyang’s oratory returned to its normal level of vitriol, North Korea announced that it 
would reopen the Kaesong economic area to normal activity and invited back the South 
Korean workers it had just ordered expelled; North Korean border forces were stood down 
from their higher alert status; and North Korea suddenly expressed renewed interest in 
returning to the Six Party talks with fewer preconditions. China’s economic pressure on 
North Korea appeared to have led to a major turnaround in North Korean behavior. But 
why did China suddenly apply major pressure to North Korea when it had previously not 
done so? 
 
We believe that with the announced U.S. plans to deploy 14 more interceptors, China 
suddenly saw North Korean behavior as a direct threat to a core Chinese interest: the 
viability of its modestly-sized strategic nuclear deterrent. It is possible that this was all just 
coincidence, but we do not believe so. More likely, this move, made possible by the thin U.S. 
BMD deployment, allowed the United States to signal China in a direct, rational, 
proportionate way, that China would pay a strategic price if it did not rein in its threatening 
neighbor. There are diminishing marginal returns for additional such deployments, however, 
and China could choose to respond with an offsetting increase in its strategic forces. The 
United States could also choose to not deploy those additional 14 interceptors, a return to 
the status quo ante, though always with the option of threatening to deploy them in the future 
if circumstances warranted. So, from an arms race stability standpoint, limited strategic BMD 
deployments have a mixture of stabilizing and destabilizing elements in a multi-polar nuclear 
world. If Chinese statements accurately reflect Chinese policy, the more strategic BMD 
capability that the United States deploys beyond current levels, the more likely that China 
will take counterbalancing actions to preserve the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.  
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In contrast, however, risk aversion appears to play mostly a stabilizing role in crisis 
management with a smaller nuclear power where strategic BMD is concerned. Facing a 
threat from a small nuclear power, and aware of its strategic BMD limitations, the United 
States cannot count on its missile defenses working reasonably well. On the other hand, 
facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear power cannot count on U.S. BMD not working 
reasonably well. Each side is deterred by the combined effects of confidence/outcome 
uncertainty and risk aversion, an important island of stability in a chaotic crisis. This 
situation is portrayed conceptually in Charts 1 and 2 below, where risk aversion acts as a 
stabilizing presence in the simplified two-country game. Chart 1 illustrates no risk aversion, 
while Chart 2 does. The shaded “island” depicted in the figure is the product of the risk 
aversion of each country in this game-theoretic construct and is labeled as a “risk-aversive 
effect.” Both sides in the crisis have the same perceptions in this theoretical case. However, 
given the stakes involved, adversaries in the crisis will likely have uncertainty and be aversive 
to risk. The greater the stakes, the greater the risk aversion. Is this stabilizing risk-aversive 
effect robust? No. Is it resilient over time? Probably not. Will it work vis-à-vis China? Not 
likely, though China should not ignore this important additional dimension of the BMD 
issue. But this risk-aversive stability effect does not appear to be trivial; it is better than 




It is possible to discern a few deterrent characteristics of thin strategic BMD; there are 
elements of both fragility and robustness, namely that it is: 
 
 Not affected by small changes in either offense or defense; 
 Affected by large offense increases, where modest defenses are simply 
overwhelmed; 
 Potentially affected by important BMD technology changes; 
 More robust against North Korean offensive technological changes than 
those by Iran, as Iran can bring far more resources to bear to defeat strategic 
BMD than can North Korea; and 
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 Subject to being eroded by perceptions of regime survival (“what have I got 
to lose?”). 
 
This purely qualitative analysis suggests that from an “arms race stability” perspective, there 
are noteworthy, however not decisive, destabilizing aspects to strategic BMD, even modest 
deployments or even just an active engineering development program.  However, from a 
crisis management perspective, there are important stabilizing dimensions to a thin strategic 
BMD posture, where risk aversion on both sides in a confrontation appears to augment the 
important deterrent effects of nuclear weapons themselves. This risk aversive effect leads 
each side to hedge against the possibility that the other country’s systems are more effective 
than expected, while its own systems are less effective than expected, suggesting that actions 
to upset the status quo could leave the country significantly worse off versus taking no 
action at all. 
 
Observations on the strategic implications of thin U.S. strategic BMD are: 
 
 BMD performance and capabilities are very important, but they are not the 
only metric by which BMD should be assessed; 
 From a crisis stability perspective, limited BMD deployments appear to be 
stabilizing as long as they remain limited; 
 From an arms race stability perspective, there are elements of both stability 
and instability present; 
 Geopolitically, it provides a useful tool for messaging and affecting adversary 
perceptions, at least at limited deployment levels; 
 Having no strategic BMD would deny the United States certain strategic and 
geopolitical benefits that have already advanced U.S. security interests; 
 In the absence of agreed limitations on strategic BMD deployments, 
countries are likely to want to hedge against the possibility of larger such 
adversary BMD deployments to preserve the credibility of their offense 
nuclear deterrent.  
 Going beyond a thin U.S. strategic missile defense posture should only be 
considered when: 
 
 A suitable answer can be provided as to how China and Russia can be 
persuaded to turn their backs on decades of policy and behavior and 
accept a serious degradation of their strategic deterrent capabilities; or 
 New defensive technologies are developed that fundamentally change 






                                                        
32 For example, we note the arguments for the possible stabilizing effects of a defense-dominant 
world in David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to 
the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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Observations on the strategic implications of a thin Chinese strategic BMD are: 
 
 As long as deployments are small, there should be no significant strategic 
impact on U.S. nuclear capabilities; 
 The prime impact will be on Indian confidence in its ability to deter China 
with nuclear weapons; 
 The demonstration of such a strategic BMD capability would enhance 
Chinese defense technology prestige in the region; and 





































Chinese Incentives and Disincentives to Develop and Deploy Strategic 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)  
 
Unlike some years ago, there is little doubt today that China is developing a strategic BMD 
capability; their flight tests alone make that clear. It is possible that China does not view this 
development as a definite precursor to deployment, though that certainly cannot be ruled 
out. The United States developed several BMD systems that it ultimately did not 
meaningfully deploy, such as the “Airborne Laser.” The United States also developed the 
Safeguard ABM system, which was operationally deployed for less than a year in 1975-76 and 
then stood down, though the large Perimeter Acquisition Radar near Grand Forks, ND, 
remains an important part of the U.S. early warning network to this day.   
 
Given the extended duration of China’s strategic BMD development program, going back 
two to three decades, it is safe to say that China is not on any crash course to develop, much 
less to deploy, a strategic BMD system. Nonetheless, China’s program has reached a stage of 
maturity that gives it a viable option to deploy if it so chooses.  The question now is 
whether, when, and to what purpose would China deploy such a system. This report 
addresses these questions, as well as the implications of possible deployments for U.S. and 
allied security interests. 
 
Below, we identify and briefly discuss possible incentives that China would have to develop 
and deploy a strategic BMD system. This list is not all-inclusive, as there are undoubtedly 
other factors at work (of which we are unaware). Neither are these incentives mutually 
exclusive; a Chinese decision to deploy could well be due to a combination of several 
incentives. Based on discussions with experts and our own judgment, we assign each of 
these incentives to three categories: 
 
1. Quite important; 
2. Important; and 
3. Less important. 
 
Quite Important Incentives 
 
a. To better understand strategic BMD technology in general and, in particular, to 
understand the intricacies and challenges of current and future U.S. BMD systems 
and their components. This understanding would be useful for China’s own planning 
and intelligence purposes and would provide insight into system vulnerabilities and 
ways to overcome or defeat U.S. BMD systems. Were China to decide to deploy 
strategic BMD, this insight would enable them to deploy a more effective system. 
Almost all experts interviewed, Chinese and American alike, generally agreed with 
this as an important incentive for China to develop strategic BMD, though some 
believe that China would not go beyond development and will not deploy a system. 
It is worth noting that China would gain important operational information and 
insight if it went on to deploy a BMD system, though most of these operational 
insights could be gained by just a limited deployment, with less incremental benefit 
from more sizable deployment levels. This incentive has its roots in China’s deep-
seated uneasiness over “falling behind” technologically, making it vulnerable to a 
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more sophisticated adversary, as China has experienced several times over the last 
two centuries (e.g., European colonial domination and the “century of humiliation,” 
as China often describes it, war with Japan, etc.).  Accordingly, as Denise Der and 
other analysts have pointed out, “there is strong Chinese sentiment that China 
cannot fall behind technologically…[lest China become] vulnerable to outside 
security threats. This is evident in the Chinese phrase luohou jiuyao aida, or ‘the 
backward will be beaten up,’ which permeates Chinese culture as well as defense 
policy.”33  
 
b. Strategic BMD testing provides an excellent cover for kinetic energy ASAT testing.  
When China tested an ASAT (anti-satellite) weapon in January 2007, it was heavily 
criticized for the debris the test generated, not to mention the test also undercut its 
campaign against the “weaponization of space.” This ASAT test used hit-to-kill 
technology very similar to the hit-to-kill technology of China’s strategic BMD that it 
is currently testing, for which China has not been criticized. These BMD tests also 
generally do not generate long-lived orbital debris, unlike a full ASAT test (another 
advantage). As a result, developing strategic BMD provides an excellent facade that 
allows China to continue to improve its kinetic ASAT technology while avoiding the 
diplomatic downsides of ASAT testing. As one senior PLA officer told us, “the 
[HTK] technology is useful for both missile defense and space applications, but space 
is more important.” Given the strong Chinese belief in the importance of informed 
warfare and of interrupting and degrading the adversary’s ability to transmit key data 
and instructions to its weapons and leadership, this PLA officer’s observation 
appears both accurate and relevant to the Chinese strategic BMD question. 
 
c. Technological prestige and messaging. Strategic BMD is a very challenging mission, 
one that very few nations have even partially mastered. Technologically, it is a much 
more difficult task to achieve than defense against shorter-range missiles, which 
travel at much slower velocities. Until recently, only the United States and Soviet 
Union achieved any level of success, and until 1984, even these superpowers relied 
upon nuclear warheads as the kill mechanism for their interceptors to destroy 
incoming ICBM re-entry vehicles, a brute force approach if ever there was one. 
Raising the technological ante still further was the advent of non-nuclear BMD 
interceptors, a challenge colorfully described as trying to “hit a bullet with a bullet.” 
The United States first achieved this in 1984 with its Homing Overlay Experiment. This 
made a major impression on Chinese defense scientists, who recognized the BMD 
and ASAT potential of such a technology that did not require detonating nuclear 
warheads to function.34 China is rightly proud of its growing technological prowess 
and seeks appropriate ways to demonstrate it. Validating this capability would 
represent a “technological merit badge” for China, one that few others can match. 
Such a capability would be a point of Chinese pride on both domestic and 
international stages. This capability would also be a subtle form of deterrence, to 
                                                        
33Denise E. Der, Playing Defense: Examining China’s Intentions Regarding Ballistic Missile Defense, 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Master’s Thesis, Spring 2015), p. 14. 
34 Private communication with Chinese scientist, February 2015. 
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send a message especially to the United States, Japan, and India that “we are strong, 
we have muscle, we are able,”35 (phrases we heard multiple times in China).  
 
d. Technological accomplishments elevating China on the international stage. The 
Chinese Communist Party has not been shy about promoting China as a powerful 
new country deserving of a major role on the world stage, with medallions of 
technological leadership serving to buttress this message. China’s manned space 
program is an excellent example of this, and arguably the challenging task of strategic 
BMD falls into this same category. 
 
e. As a counter to growing Indian ICBM capabilities. India has successfully tested its 
canister-launched 3-stage Agni-5 ICBM and is expected to begin deploying it in 
2016, placing all major Chinese metropolitan areas within range of Indian nuclear 
weapons for the first time. Its most recent test in January 2015 was from a truck-
mounted canister, indicating road mobility (and thus a higher degree of survivability). 
In addition, India is expected to begin testing an even longer range, larger payload 
Agni-6 ICBM by 2017, expected to be capable of carrying multiple warheads. As 
both China and India likely see their offensive nuclear capabilities as intended for 
deterrence, not nuclear war-fighting, these developments need not be directly 
provocative. But from a domestic and political perspective, Chinese leaders may feel 
the need to respond to such developments, as “Chinese nuclear vulnerability to 
India,” symbolized by the new ICBMs, could be a potent political issue (see below). 
 
f. Keeping up with India’s BMD developments. A related incentive for China to 
develop and deploy at least some strategic BMD is that India is seeking to develop 
and deploy a strategic BMD system itself. According to India’s Director General of 
the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), “Phase II [of the 
missile defense system] would be completed by 2016 to protect against missiles 
having range up to 5,000 kilometers.”36 From a purely political perspective, it is 
difficult to believe that China would acquiesce in India having such a BMD system 
while China would not. As one Chinese academic told us, “can you imagine India 
having strategic ballistic missile defense and China not having it?” (This statement 
was made in a tone of voice of complete incredulity.) India and China are taking 
some important steps to reduce tensions between them, but there nonetheless 




a. Reinforce Chinese ICBM survivability. China is deeply committed to the deterrent 
credibility of its nuclear forces, especially to ensure that it can withstand an intended 
disarming first-strike and still have sufficient retaliatory weapons. Given its lower 
warhead numbers, China has a smaller margin of error and is quite sensitive to 
                                                        
35 Private communications with two separate Chinese academic experts, February 2015. 
36 Wang Ting, “Agni V and China/India Ballistic Missile Defense,” presentation at Carnegie undated 
briefing at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Wang_Ting%20Presentation.pdf, accessed on September 17, 
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potential perceived threats to its deterrent capabilities. As one Chinese specialist told 
us, “do not mistake China’s lean nuclear deterrent as meaning it will not do whatever 
is necessary to maintain the viability of that smaller deterrent.”37 China has great 
respect for U.S. technological capabilities, and it is possible that it would have 
concerns that road mobility is not a permanent guarantee of ICBM survivability 
going forward. As U.S. surveillance, intelligence, sensor, reconnaissance, and 
(especially) software capabilities advance, along with a burgeoning ability to extract 
useful information from the “big data” that these capabilities provide, China will 
likely have continuing and growing concerns about road mobile ICBM survivability 
going forward. The United States (or Russia, for that matter) would not need to 
precisely identify a mobile ICBM’s location, though that may become possible at 
some point with appropriate sensors and big-data analytics. It is important to 
remember that road mobile ICBMs are much “softer” targets than silo-based ones, 
which means that a Chinese adversary would only need to be able to locate a Chinese 
road mobile ICBM to within a few miles to have confidence in its ability to attack 
and destroy it with a nuclear weapon. A Chinese BMD capability tailored to this 
threat could not guarantee survivability, but at the very least, it could seriously 
complicate an adversary’s planning. China could not count on its BMD working well, 
but neither could the adversary count on its own BMD not working well. This risk-
aversive “hysteresis effect,” as we have called it, creates a modest but important 
island of stability in an otherwise potentially unstable crisis situation. (See Figure 1.) 
In a high-stakes crisis where the use of nuclear weapons is being contemplated, a 
modest level of Chinese BMD defense of its ICBMs, both silo-based and road-
mobile, could strengthen China’s ability to deter. Again, China asserts that it will take 
the steps needed to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, and BMD to 
defend its ICBMs could be a component of that.38   
 
b. Inoculate the leadership against domestic charges it was leaving China defenseless 
against external ballistic missile threats. Xi Jinping is a powerful leader, but he serves 
as President at the pleasure of the now seven members of the Standing Committee 
of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. While his position presently 
appears to be quite secure, it is not too difficult to envision a scenario where his hold 
on power could become more tenuous: a serious decline in China’s economy, 
growing unemployment, a stock market or banking system collapse, a worsening of 
the long litany of ills that afflict China, new scandals, and more. Under a political 
attack from another political faction within China due to poor leadership, President 
Xi would risk political disaster if his critics successfully argued that even a single 
nuclear-armed missile heading toward China could not be stopped.  A comparable 
argument in the United States had political impact in the late 1990s, and put 
considerable pressure on President Clinton and missile defense opponents in 
Congress.  Even a limited Chinese missile defense, which would provide other 
security benefits as well, would seem like a reasonable and low-cost domestic 
political insurance policy to take out against such a possible, though not too likely, 
political challenge. Politically, there is a significant difference between a small 
                                                        
37 Private communication, February 2015. 
38 One Chinese academic we met with in spring 2015 told us that he is writing an article that will 
argue for China’s deployment of limited BMD to protect ICBMs. 
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strategic BMD system and none at all, as U.S. domestic politics have demonstrated. 
 
c. Non-nuclear counter to U.S. conventional prompt global strike capabilities. Chinese 
specialists have voiced increasing concerns over growing U.S. capabilities to use what 
they see as “conventional weapons with strategic effects,” e.g. extremely accurate 
conventional munitions capable of destroying ICBM silos, a capability heretofore 
only deliverable by ICBM nuclear warheads. This has put China in a difficult position 
with respect to its nuclear “No First Use” policy. Such advanced conventional 
attacks could force China into a strategically difficult corner: either initiate the use of 
nuclear weapons and risk a greater nuclear war, or only respond conventionally, in 
which case such advanced U.S. conventional weapons could destroy China’s ICBMs, 
making it more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.  China presumably would want some 
effective non-nuclear options to avoid this agonizing choice in a crisis. Strategic 
BMD would provide one such option to Chinese senior leadership, at least for long-
range ballistic missile-delivered conventional munitions. Indeed, China is re-
examining a number of issues in its strategic policies, especially “No First Use.” One 
well-placed Chinese person in China stated to us that there are now voices within 
China openly calling for China to drop this policy.39 Some level of strategic BMD 
could enable China to maintain its NFU policy while also providing options in 
dealing with difficult crisis scenarios such as these.  
 
d. Defend essential “point targets.” This is a variation on defending Chinese ICBM 
locations. China may wish to defend smaller, high-value assets against possible attack 
from, say, India. Particular candidates would be central leadership facilities, e.g., 
Beijing, essential military facilities, such as nuclear weapons storage sites and the 
Chinese SSBN base, or key economic areas whose loss could threaten domestic 
stability, e.g., the Three Gorges Dam, and others.40 The cost of such defense would 
be substantial, so the number of such facilities would essentially need to be limited to 
a few high priority locations, but certainly senior leadership protection could qualify. 
Both the radars and interceptors for such point defenses would be different than 
those used for broad area defense, with interception taking place endo-
atmospherically rather than exo-atmospherically (consequently, this could be a 
drawback for this type of defense). 
 
Less Important Incentives 
 
a. Introduce a level of uncertainty in U.S. allies about the U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence guarantee, especially as the U.S. strategic arsenal is reduced. Any Chinese 
deployment of strategic BMD would likely introduce at least a slight note of 
uncertainty about its impact on the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee to its allies. 
As discussed below, even if the reality of the United States being fully able to counter 
                                                        
39 Private communication, February 2015. 
40 In 1993, a Chinese scholar published an article that examined the threat to China’s Three Gorges 
Dam from missile strikes and raised the possibility of missile defense to protect it. See: Wan Yung-
Kui, “Can the Chinese Armed Forces Successfully Protect the Three-Gorges Dam?” Hong Kong 
Tangai, No. 31, October 15, 1993, pp. 72-80, FBIS 3769 3057 2710, as referenced in Roberts (2003), 
p. 21. 
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the modest effects of such defenses, there could still be a lingering uncertainty about 
the impact on U.S. deterrent capabilities, especially given uncertainty over what 
China might choose to do in the future with its strategic BMD, i.e., deploy more 
capable and more extensive defenses. Thus, it could serve at the margins to weaken 
U.S. ties with its Asian allies.  
 
b. Chinese strategic BMD would provide China important negotiating leverage in any 
eventual multilateral strategic arms control negotiations. China is clearly unhappy 
with U.S. strategic BMD deployments. Any further strategic arms agreements need 
await an improved environment between Russia and the United States, and even 
then, the earliest that China might enter into such negotiations would be in a round 
subsequent to that. Nonetheless, a deployed strategic BMD would give China extra 
bargaining leverage in any future arms control negotiations, and could even exert 
some influence nearer term. During the latter stages of the Cold War, the United 
States, on more than one occasion, developed, and even deployed, weapons that 
were primarily intended to pressure the Soviet Union to negotiate limitations on 
those classes of weapons.41 If U.S. efforts to get New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty follow-on negotiations resume at some point in the future (and China 
becomes a party to such talks), at some point, a China that was in the midst of 
deploying strategic BMD capabilities might now be in a stronger position to leverage 
such present and prospective deployments, therefore putting pressure on the United 
States to agree to some further upper-bound-level limitations on strategic BMD. In 
addition, China has been increasingly interested in promoting the idea of strategic 
stability talks with the United States, with strategic BMD a key concern of theirs in 
terms of strategic stability and their own vulnerability (as discussed earlier). Having 
their own system in place would enhance their leverage in getting such talks initiated, 
as well as giving them added negotiating heft in such talks. Chinese interest in and 
testing of hypersonic vehicles also partially falls in this category of incentive. 
 
c. Technology spin-off, especially for theater BMD. Pursuing strategic BMD would 
provide important ancillary technological benefits in addition to the biggest spin-off 
(relevant to ASAT). Chinese theater ballistic missile defense, an area of which China 
is actively pursuing, would be one obvious beneficiary, as well as radar and data 
processing capabilities, solid rocket motor technology, and others. This spin-off 
factor would not likely be determinative, but it could well contribute to a decision 
                                                        
41 In 1978, the year after ASAT arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union began, President Jimmy Carter directed the Air Force to develop a new ASAT system 
(involving an interceptor missile with a hit-to-kill warhead launched from an F-15 at high altitude) to 
give the U.S. leverage in these negotiations; the Soviet Union had already demonstrated a co-orbital 
ASAT.  The talks ended with no agreement after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979.  The Reagan Administration continued the U.S. ASAT program and conducted a successful 
test in September 1985, though it was not deployed based on Congressional action. Carter also gave 
the go-ahead to the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile programs to pressure the 
Soviet Union to agree to limitations on intermediate range nuclear forces, particularly the 3-warhead 
Soviet SS-20 IRBM.  Despite great turmoil in Europe when these U.S. weapons were initially 
deployed, the strategy was eventually successful and led to the signing of the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty 
in 1987 that banned all such weapons for both countries.     
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that was also influenced by other incentives. Certainly the early-warning radars 
needed for strategic BMD deployment would greatly improve China’s early warning 
and situational awareness capabilities, giving China a number of strategic options, 
such as launching its ICBMs on warning instead of waiting until nuclear warheads 
detonated on Chinese soil.  
 
None of these possible explanations should be considered as black-or-white. A more 
nuanced view of Chinese motivations would probably involve a combination of several 
individual motives. In addition, depending on the success (or lack thereof) of the R&D 
program, geopolitical developments, etc., Chinese motivations could change over time. It is 
entirely possible (and likely), that China’s motivations today are different from what initially 
led Beijing to begin its modern-day program more than 30 years ago. Certainly its test 
successes, developing interest in ASAT capability, substantial economic progress, and 
growing need to stay abreast of technology have all shaped its strategic BMD program over 
the years.   
 
Likely Important Disincentives 
 
a. Cost of deployment and life cycle costs. Developing and deploying effective strategic 
BMD would be an expensive proposition, though China appears to have already 
taken on the cost burden of developing such a capability. A number of academics in 
China made references to the cost of deployment, a few calling strategic BMD “a 
money burning program,” and “a hole with no bottom.”42 The cost of the U.S. 
program was foremost in these experts’ minds, though no one openly stated this as a 
reason why deployment would never be done by China. The implication was that any 
deployment would likely be of a limited nature (if done at all). The declining rate of 
growth of China’s GDP in the last couple of years (after years of 10 percent annual 
growth, China itself projects 2015 GDP growth of 7 percent, and that may be 
optimistic in light of recent more bearish indicators) makes it more likely that China’s 
defense budget rate of growth will begin to decline as well. As a result, expensive 
new programs in this circumstance would likely be subject to more scrutiny. 
 
b. Contradict past Chinese position on strategic BMD. For many years, China has been 
highly critical of U.S. strategic BMD efforts (as pointed out earlier). To actually 
deploy such a system would represent a major shift in a key Chinese policy position, 
similar to Chinese behavior on ASAT. Deployment would also be a jarring departure 
from the peaceful image China seeks to present to the world. Of course, if Chinese 
leaders decide that such a move would be in their national interest, they would 
provide justifications for the change, likely stating that U.S. behavior is forcing them 
against their preferences to take this otherwise unnecessary step. 
 
c. Chinese deployment could trigger U.S./Indian/Japanese/other responses. While 
Chinese work on developing strategic BMD does not appear to have led to any 
significant responses from other countries, actual deployment could do so. For 
alliance management purposes at a minimum, as well as to address possible domestic 
political reactions, the United States would likely take at least some steps in response, 
                                                        
42 Private communications, February 2015. 
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perhaps in the form of additional work on BMD countermeasures. It is useful to 
note that in its recent weapons developments, Russia has emphasized new ICBMs 
that have substantially improved abilities to penetrate even advanced BMD systems, 
a logical way to reassure the domestic audience about Russia’s continuing ability to 
deter its adversaries. In the event of a Chinese deployment of a limited strategic 
BMD system, Japan may seek U.S. reassurances, which the countermeasures work 
would help to support. It could well further incentivize greater Japanese defense 
efforts and even further revisions to the Japanese Constitution to give Japan’s Self-
Defense Force explicit approval to project military power beyond the very limited 
supporting role it currently plays, a matter of continuing concern to China. It seems 
likely that deployment would further drive other Asian countries to seek closer 
relations with the United States, given their growing fears of Chinese hegemony in 
Asia. Perhaps the greatest and most direct impact of BMD deployment would be on 
India As mentioned earlier, India is already pressing ahead with BMD and long-range 
ballistic missiles. Chinese BMD deployment could further stimulate India to build 
more missiles with extended strike capability to target all of China, and to deploy 
multiple-warhead missiles, such as what is projected for the Agni-6 ICBM, to 
































Perspectives from Chinese Experts 
 
Chinese experts were relatively open in their views and were largely not dismissive (though 
some were skeptical) of the idea of China possibly deploying strategic BMD. Generally, they 
understood that it is important for China to understand BMD technology and to know how 
to build and deploy such a system, whether or not it would actually do so. No one 
questioned the value of the strategic BMD development program that is currently underway; 
there were only cautionary comments about the eventual cost. They all agreed that it was 
important that China not be technologically surprised, and that China must know how to 
build such a system, both for its own purposes and to better understand how to penetrate 
U.S. strategic BMD. 
 
For those more familiar with the program, Chinese academics and specialists emphasized 
that such a development program signals to India and Japan that “we know how to do this, 
we know how to protect ourselves, and we have the muscle to do so.” In this light, we were 
told that the message of Chinese BMD efforts is primarily for India and Japan, not the 
United States, suggesting that there is an important regional and geopolitical message that 
China is sending with its BMD program.43   
 
Chinese experts stated that while current U.S. strategic BMD is not a serious a threat to 
Chinese security interests, “we want to watch what you do.” They would be more concerned 
if the next generation of U.S. BMD interceptors were substantially more capable than the 
current generation. There was broad agreement that it would make little sense for China to 
seek to defend against U.S. nuclear warheads given the potentially several hundred warheads 
the United States could launch within minutes. The United States has far too many 
warheads, so it would be futile, as well as costly (again, “money burning program,” “hole 
with no bottom”) on China’s part. 
 
Overall, the experts appeared positive (more so than what the authors expected) about the 
possibility of China not only developing, but deploying, some level of strategic BMD. There 
was little disavowal of Chinese interest in strategic BMD, unlike the forthright statements of 
disinterest in strategic BMD that characterized most dialogue with China a decade ago. Most 
did not rule out China’s full-scale development of strategic BMD and believed in the 
rationale for doing so. A good number believed that at least limited deployment was 
possible. It is important to note that the more authoritative the person, the more the person 
seemed to be open to the idea. Several academics argue that China persisted to try to 
dissuade the United States, through diplomacy, not to deploy strategic BMD (or at least to 
agree to limits on such deployments), but these efforts clearly failed. Accordingly, China’s 
current back-up option is to deploy some of its own strategic BMD and use it, at least in 
part, to encourage the U.S. to agree to strategic BMD limits. Although uncomfortable with 
current U.S. strategic BMD deployments, Chinese experts understand the North Korean/ 
Iranian missile threats’ rationale for them. Their major worry is that there is nothing to stop 
the United States from deploying more, and more capable, missile defense intercept 
                                                        
43 See: James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks  
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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capabilities.  This is particularly worrisome given the United States’ vast BMD experience 
and general technological pre-eminence.  
 
Indeed, the most revealing comments came from higher level PLA officials, who 
acknowledged in early 2015 that “internal discussions about China deploying strategic BMD 
are taking place, though nothing has been resolved.” They noted that any decision taken 
would be at a very high level and will not be taken lightly. “There is greater interest now in 
the possibility of deploying strategic BMD … several issues are being balanced,” suggesting 
that the issue is rising in importance at senior levels, likely with President Xi Jinping. One of 
the issues cited more than once is on the number of sites and interceptors, and likely several 
of the issues mentioned earlier in the discussion on incentives and disincentives are also in 
play. As of mid-2015, no decisions had yet been made (at least publicly) by China on 
whether or not to deploy strategic BMD. 
 
These officials acknowledged that China is conducting research and development on 
strategic BMD. In the discussion, the role of hit-to-kill technology was called out, citing that 
it is crucial for both space and BMD purposes. In a noteworthy explanation, as noted earlier, 
we were told that though key for both applications, “space has the higher priority” [emphasis 
added]. This appears to align with more recent Chinese writings about the importance of 
space and being able to interrupt an adversary’s [read “the United States”] being able to 
exploit space to conduct operations at great distances. Of course, a central Chinese concern 
is being able to deter the United States from sending its carrier battle groups to defend 



























Strategic Issues Raised by Chinese Strategic BMD 
 
Should China decide to deploy strategic BMD at any level, such a decision would represent a 
significant new development in the strategic nuclear environment. In combination with 
China’s vigorous strategic nuclear force modernization and expanding numbers of available 
strategic warheads, it puts China on a path to becoming a more significant player in strategic 
nuclear competition and would fundamentally alter the offense-defense dynamics of this 
competition, creating a far more complicated, multi-country issue. In addition, these broader 
Chinese strategic nuclear actions seem almost certain to impel India into this competition 
(increasing the complexity to at least four major nuclear-armed states), which may occur 
anyway for reasons unrelated to strategic BMD. 
 
Impact on India. For all but the smallest BMD deployments, China’s strategic BMD would 
pose the greatest challenge to India and its small yet growing number of ballistic missile 
warheads, far more of an impact than for the United States and Russia and their several 
thousand nuclear warheads. At a minimum, Chinese deployment would likely spur India to 
increase its efforts (that are already underway) to develop its own strategic BMD, a program 
that, to date, has been longer on rhetoric than it has been on accomplishments, in order to 
ensure that India is not perceived as being left behind in this competition. Certainly, India 
would also likely advance any ongoing work on BMD penetration aids. A central strategic 
question would be how India chooses to respond to such a Chinese development, both 
offensively and defensively.  
 
Impact on Pakistan. Given the generally positive nature of the Chinese-Pakistani 
relationship, it seems likely that any impact on Pakistan would occur indirectly via Pakistan’s 
reaction to Indian responses. India has already been working on theater missile defenses 
against Pakistan’s ballistic missiles, but a possible India-China competition would almost 
certainly have spillover effects of some kind on Pakistan. 
 
Impact on Russia. For the duration of the Cold War, in terms of economic and military 
strength, China was by far the inferior partner of the two Communist nations, and to this 
day, Russian strategic forces far outnumber those of China. Today their roles are much 
different, and China is the more economically advanced of the two countries, with Russia 
working hard to derive economic benefits from a relationship it seeks to improve with 
China. While nominally enjoying good relations with China, Russia remains uneasy over its 
increasingly powerful nuclear-armed neighbor, particularly that China is free to deploy 
intermediate range missiles capable of striking Russia, while Russia is barred by the INF 
Treaty from deploying comparable forces against China. Russia is forced to allocate 
warheads from its strategic forces for an anti-China mission, and Chinese BMD would only 
exacerbate that problem. Such a Chinese BMD deployment would also aggravate a politically 
sensitive Russian insecurity of being left behind by technically more advanced countries, as 
China has now demonstrated a non-nuclear, hit-to-kill capability that Russia does not yet 
possess (or at least has not yet demonstrated). Russia should feel no more threatened by 
Chinese strategic BMD than the United States, but given the troubled history between the 
two countries, this cannot be taken for granted.    
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Impact on the United States and U.S. Allies. A modest Chinese deployment of strategic 
BMD should have little effect on the U.S. ability to deter China. Not only does the United 
States have a large nuclear arsenal, a stockpile of penetration aid technology, and other 
countermeasures to address ballistic missile defenses, it also has by far the most robust, air-
breathing strategic nuclear capability of any nuclear power, with B-2 and B-52H bombers 
(some equipped with air-launched cruise missiles) and dual-capable aircraft (based in 
Europe), not to mention plans for a new-generation Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).  
These aircraft would be largely unaffected by Chinese BMD. The impact of Chinese strategic 
BMD would instead come from U.S. domestic political reactions and the geopolitical impact 
on U.S. allies and friends from such a development. As alluded to earlier, even if not strictly 
necessary, the United States could take relatively inexpensive measures to reduce the trivial 
technical impact of such a Chinese deployment on U.S. offensive nuclear capabilities and to 
respond to any domestic pressure to counter the new challenge. These steps would also be 
useful in addressing any new allied concerns, but it seems possible, even probable, that some, 
particularly U.S. East Asian allies, would need reassurance, given China’s recent moves on 
disputed territorial islands and its overall more assertive regional posture. While current U.S. 
policy rules out any negotiated limitations on missile defense numbers, it is possible that 
specific transparency and other confidence-building measures could help to reduce allied 
anxieties, in addition to U.S. policy and programmatic steps. At a minimum, some kind of a 
dialogue on missile defense could be useful. To the extent that China might be unwilling to 
engage in such dialogue, that, at least, could indicate that China has plans for more extensive 
BMD deployments. In short, there would be minimal programmatic impact of such a move 
by China; the diplomatic and domestic impacts, though greater, should be manageable 
(unless external factors inflate public and/or allied perceptions of the challenges such 
defenses present).        
 
How much missile defense might China deploy? At present, this is unanswerable, though 
logic and judgment offer some clues. The same logic that has led China into an apparently 
robust development program can help U.S. and allied defense planners understand the 
options China must confront as it approaches decisions on whether and how much missile 
defense to deploy. It is highly unlikely that China would seek to defend against either the 
United States or Russia launching a massive nuclear attack. To even begin to do so would 
require as many as several thousand interceptors, plus extensive radar, command and 
control, and other support as needed. If China were to deploy any number of interceptors at 
all, it would probably make sense to deploy 10-20, perhaps one or two squadrons, if only to 
assure that China understands the operational challenges such deployments can present. If 
China sought to defend its fixed ICBMs, this would suggest 20-40 interceptors to defend its 
fleet of 20 DF-5 ICBMs. To match the United States, China would deploy 44 interceptors, 
or to match Russia, it would need to deploy 68. If it sought to defend against Indian nuclear 
warheads however, the numbers become much less clear. A first order assumption might be 
to plan on 20 Indian Agni-5/6 missiles (the same number as Chinese DF-5), plus 2-4 
Arihant SSBNs with four missiles on each platform. If the Agni-6 is not MIRVed (and 
assuming China would want to fire two interceptors at each warhead), this would mean a 
minimum of 72 interceptors, though it could pace its deployments with the Indian 
deployments, as it will likely require at least several years to a decade or more before India 
could deploy such missile levels. If the Agni-6 is MIRVed, this could increase these numbers 
to over 100 interceptors. 
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These are just “back of the envelope” types of calculations and should be considered 
notional. These estimates do not reflect whether the interceptors would be exo- or endo-
atmospheric, the former probably more expensive than the latter. Precision on these 
calculations is not possible, but by inspection, there is the suggestion that any Chinese 
deployment of strategic BMD would likely be fewer than 100 interceptors, and perhaps 
fewer than 50. Conversations with Chinese specialists suggest that China may take a more 
target-specific approach to missile defense rather than seek to provide a thin defense for the 
entire country. The United States’ GMD system is estimated to cost about $41 billion 
through 2017 in R&D alone, with the program having started on a highly concurrent basis in 
December 2004.44 It seems unlikely that it would cost China a comparable amount to deploy 
a rudimentary capability comparable to what the United States has paid. To first order, one 
could make the very crude assumption that to deploy 44 interceptors and associated radars, 
it would cost China about $41 billion, minus what they have already expended. If China has 
spent half that amount already, and spent the rest over a 15 year period, that would be an 
expenditure of $1.34 billion per year, slightly less than one percent of China’s 2015 official 
defense budget of $141.45 billion. Some believe that the latter figure does not fully cover all 
Chinese defense expenditures.45 This $1.34 billion annual figure is substantial but hardly 
overwhelming. Even if China’s defense budget growth drops from its current official rate of 
10 percent to the estimated GDP growth rate of 7 percent, it means that China’s defense 
budget will grow by about ten times as much as the estimated cost to deploy a limited 
strategic BMD capability. Given that China is already expending an unknown (but hardly 
insubstantial) amount on its strategic BMD program, the incremental cost of deployment 
may be much less. To the extent that cost is a major consideration, a strategic BMD system 
based on nuclear-armed interceptors would probably be much less costly because high 
interceptor accuracy would not be required – but to date, China has shown no interest in this 
option. Its geopolitical unattractiveness and the fact that employing it would require nuclear 
use likely pose as overwhelming obstacles for China.  
 
Based on the tests that it has conducted to date, China seems to be more interested in 
developing a thin, nation-wide strategic BMD capability rather than point defense (though 
the latter should not be ruled out). A point defense system would make sense in terms of 
defending their ICBM fields, or key government facilities, but this would not be strategically 
consistent with their nuclear policy, which is to avoid getting drawn into an “arms race” with 
the United States. Also, such interceptors would not provide the “cover” for ASAT testing 
that a longer-range, exo-atmospheric interceptor would (the kind that a thin nation-wide 
defense would employ). 
 
In short, it seems unlikely that, were China to proceed with some BMD deployment, that it 
would rush to deploy large numbers of interceptors, radars, and necessary support. A rough 
case can be made that China would, at least initially, deploy fewer than 100 exo-atmospheric 
interceptors, and quite possibly fewer than 50, if for no other reason than to “walk before it 
runs” with this new technology that it has limited experience, and to avoid the geopolitical 
                                                        
44 Government Accountability Office, “Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,” GAO-13-294SP, 
Washington, DC, March 2013, p.51. 
45 See arguments as discussed in Zachary Keck, “China’s Defense Budget: A Mixed Bag,” The 
Diplomat, March 8, 2014. 
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glare of deploying more strategic BMD interceptors than any other country’s number of 
















































Impetus for China to Deploy Strategic BMD 
 
As noted earlier, even limited strategic BMD deployments would allow China to conduct 
tests that would be very useful for their ASAT program. This is an important strategic 
priority for China and would by itself make a strong case for modest Chinese deployment of 
strategic BMD. We believe it is not just a coincidence that there have been no more official 
Chinese ASAT tests, yet there have been several officially announced BMD tests. The 
United States could hardly criticize China for conducting strategic BMD tests when the 
United States conducts such tests itself. 
 
We believe it is also significant that China characterized the interception test it conducted in 
2014 as a BMD test, though the United States has been clear that it believes the test was an 
ASAT test. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose earlier this year at the 
FAS workshop on this subject, “Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test, let 
me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the event was 
indeed an ASAT test.”46 If the U.S. assessment about the 2014 test is correct, this contrast 
directly links Chinese strategic BMD testing with its ASAT program and strengthens the 
argument for the usefulness of strategic BMD as a plausible cover for ASAT testing. If 
China seeks to deploy an ASAT system, deployment of BMD would advance China’s 
security interests for both strategic BMD and ASAT: two benefits for the price of one. 
 
We were also impressed by repeated references to the message that such a deployment 
would signify that “China has muscle,” and “it is able” to tackle challenging but important 
defense missions. It also appears important to China that India, Japan, and the United States 
(in that order), receive this message that China is capable of defending itself. Besides serving 
direct strategic and mission requirements, such deployment would also serve important 
political objectives of regional prestige and sway, the aforementioned “technological merit 
badge” of Chinese accomplishment and expertise. In addition, China would obtain 
important operational understanding of BMD systems, such as those of potential adversaries 
like the United States and India, which would benefit their own BMD system and aid in 
coping with those of others.  
 
There seems to be little question that China is developing a strategic BMD system capability.  
In such a development program, the articles of equipment are typically much less expensive 
than the extensive cost of development, and initial deployments are easily represented as part 
of the development program, as has been true for the U.S. GMD system. Thus, China will 
be able to realize important strategic objectives with only modest deployments and likely 
fairly modest incremental costs that can be portrayed as part of a longstanding R&D 
program. Accordingly, it would not be surprising if China deploys a limited BMD system 
involving radars and other early warning systems, interceptors, command and control 
centers, and links to decision-makers, in the near- to mid-term. An interesting question for 
China concerns how much autonomy would be granted to lower levels of authority to 
launch defensive interceptors. Chinese experts often emphasize that China would not need 
to launch a nuclear retaliation quickly, were it attacked with nuclear weapons; it could take its 
time in doing so. At the offensive level, this removes the need for quick decision-making at 
                                                        
46 Frank Rose, op.cit.; see Appendix A-1. 
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senior levels. However, strategic BMD allows no such luxury of time. At ICBM ranges, 
China would need to launch interceptors within 15-20 minutes of hostile ICBM launch to 
have any hope of making an exo-atmospheric interception. Shorter-range intercept within 
the atmosphere to defend point targets could allow China to wait only a few minutes longer, 
and thus this would be of marginal value. 
 
Another consideration in this question of possible Chinese strategic BMD deployment is 
China’s need for an early warning infrared satellite system to detect potential hostile ballistic 
missile launches. China does not say whether it has such a capability, and on an unclassified 
basis, there have only been rumors that it may have such a set of satellites.47 Such a satellite 
constellation would not be necessary for a purely ASAT-oriented system, but it would be 
essential for strategic BMD in order to provide enough warning time for a Chinese missile 
defense system. Deployment of such a satellite configuration could still be useful for 
addressing theater missile launches, and it would help maintain the cover of a system that 
was actually ASAT-oriented. At a minimum, such a Chinese early-warning satellite 






























                                                        
47 See, for example, Stephen Clark, “Long March Rocket Boosts Chinese Satellite to Orbit,” Spaceflight 




1. None of the interlocutors we met offered attempts to “explain away” Chinese 
strategic BMD development activities. The development program was accepted as a 
given, though some say for technology insight only. Whatever else one can say, 
China’s thinking on strategic BMD appears to have shifted in recent years. 
 
2. The connection between strategic BMD and ASAT was widely accepted and 
understood. 
 
3. No one tried to “explain away” Chinese ASAT activity. At a minimum, it was 
defended as necessary for technical readiness and to understand what the United 
States and others might be capable of regarding ASAT. 
   
4. The question of deploying at least some level of strategic BMD is being discussed 
within the Chinese government. As of mid-2015, no decisions have been made (at 
least publicly) on the extent of deployment, if there is any at all, but judgements will 
be made at very senior levels if (and when) strategically necessary.  
 
5. The size and technological depth of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal are such that 
any likely level of Chinese strategic BMD deployment would have very little effect on 
U.S. strategic deterrence capabilities. Any impact would be almost entirely in the U.S. 


























Conclusions and Findings 
 
 Chinese development of strategic BMD is ongoing and is helping China to 
understand the complexities and nuances of designing such a system, what its weak 
points are, and whether or not to deploy such a BMD system. In addition, this 
development provides an important hedging option for China against an uncertain 
and evolving future strategic environment.  
 
 The question of whether or not to deploy some level of strategic BMD is under 
active consideration at present, though no decisions have been made (as far as 
publicly announced). Such a decision will have to be made at a very high level.   
 
 China faces a variety of incentives and disincentives for deploying strategic BMD.  
Whether and for what reasons China would deploy such a missile defense are unclear 
at present, but the very fact that such a decision is under consideration is telling and 
represents a major deviation from where China was on this issue only ten years ago.   
 
 At a minimum, it appears that a Chinese deployment of strategic BMD is probably 
less unlikely than most U.S. defense analysts have assessed in the past. 
 
 Should China decide to deploy such defenses, the most likely reasons would be to: 
 
 Provide a plausible cover to continue testing its kinetic energy ASAT       
system. This suggests that a thin, regional/nationwide defense would be 
more likely than a point defense, though the latter cannot be ruled out. Point 
defense would not provide much cover for an ASAT testing program. 
 Send a strategic message to India, Japan, and the United States (in that 
order), that China is capable of defending itself and overcoming major 
technical obstacles to do so. 
 Obtain important operational understanding of BMD systems for its own use 
and to better understand the systems that others may have or may develop. 
 Enhance its regional prestige and sway, a “technological merit badge” of 
recognition for achieving such a difficult technological task. 
  
 Should China decide to deploy strategic BMD, limited deployment levels appear to 
be more likely than larger levels. The most compelling reason for China to deploy 
such defenses is that it would not require large numbers of interceptors.  
Furthermore, even were it to ultimately deploy greater levels, China would want to 
gain more experience in what for it would be a new class of weapons. 
 
 The incremental cost to China of a limited deployment of strategic BMD as part of 
its overall R&D program would probably be modest in comparison to the security 
benefits China would receive, even taking into account some political drawbacks. 
Accordingly, the odds are fairly good that China will make at least a modest 
deployment of strategic BMD in the near- to mid-term (though this is uncertain).    
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 It is unlikely that China would seek to deploy more than a limited level of strategic 
missile defense, barring some extraordinary technology breakthrough. Seeking to 
defend against the larger U.S. or Russian nuclear arsenals would require a very large 
investment with no assurance that it could reach its goal, as either Chinese adversary 
would almost certainly take off-setting steps to counter such a Chinese strategic 
BMD initiative. 
 
 The United States would likely have no technical reason to make any significant 
adjustments to its strategic posture in response to the most likely levels of Chinese 
strategic BMD deployments, should they take place. That said, it would be relatively 
more likely that some U.S. responses would be needed to address domestic U.S. 
political concerns, in order to demonstrate that the U.S. strategic nuclear posture and 
forces are robust and able to deal with such deployments. U.S. allies, particularly 
those in Asia, would likely also require some reassurance. To the extent that any 
programmatic changes would be needed for reassurance reasons, there are a number 
of options available to the United States, particularly in BMD penetration aids and 
enhancements to the bomber leg of the triad, that would suffice.  
 
 A Chinese move to deploy early warning satellites would be a significant indicator of 
greater interest in strategic BMD deployment, as it would be a crucial component of 
an effective strategic BMD system. Such satellites would not be necessary for a 
purely ASAT-testing-oriented deployment. 
 
 
In closing, Chinese deployment of even a limited strategic BMD would be an important 
development in an increasingly multi-polar strategic nuclear world.  There should be no 
cause for alarm if China does so, but the implications would be significant and would 
merit greater understanding through increased dialogue and more thorough policy and 
technical review.  This study and report have only scratched the surface of this issue.  Of 
particular interest would be to understand the new dynamics of a multi-polar strategic 
BMD world, especially in light of Indian determination to deploy such defenses and 
Russia a growing possibility in this field as well.  FAS plans to examine this issue in the 
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Introduction 
Thank you all very much, and a special thanks to Bruce and Chuck for having me here today 
to address this important workshop. 
I’m told that this group is exploring China’s potential interest in and deployment of strategic 
ballistic missile defense and what that means for U.S. and allied security. 
At the State Department, we’re taking a hard look at it as well, and in particular, the role of 
ballistic missile defense in achieving the overarching goal of strategic stability between the 
United States and China. 
Overview of Strategic Stability with China 
Before discussing China’s interest in developing a BMD system and the possible implications 
of such an effort, I’d first like to provide an overview of what the United States is doing to 
ensure a stable U.S.-China strategic relationship in the region. 
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to maintaining 
strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on strategic 
stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent 
security relationship with China. 
During the Cold War, many associated strategic stability with what we called “mutual assured 
destruction,” the notion that the incentive to initiate nuclear use would be discouraged by 
the fear of suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. This notion, of course, is ill-suited and 
too narrow to fully capture the U.S.-China relationship, given our multifaceted and shared 
interests. In today’s world, strategic stability encompasses much more than just nuclear 
relations and reflects the fact that the U.S.-China relationship, which has both elements of 
competition and cooperation, is not adversarial. 
The strategic relationship between the United States and China is complex, and we each view 
stability differently. Thus, it is important that we have frank and open dialogue about how 
our nations define and view strategic stability and how we perceive our nuclear postures and 
policies impacting this balance. As part of these discussions, the United States is willing to 
discuss all issues, including missile defense, space-related issues, conventional precision strike 
capabilities, and nuclear weapons issues, with the goal of improving the conditions for a 
more predictable and safer security environment. 
A sustained and substantive discussion of our national approaches to maintaining effective 
 42 
deterrent postures and modernization of associated strategic capabilities can increase 
understanding, enhance confidence, and reduce mistrust. 
Overview of China’s BMD Activities 
As you’re all aware, China is continuing to develop its BMD capabilities. 
Although China does not say much about its BMD programs, China publicly announced that 
it conducted ground-based mid-course BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014. I’ll say more 
about the 2014 “BMD” test later. Chinese state media has stated that such tests are defensive 
in nature and are not targeted at any country. 
I was in Beijing earlier this month, and the message I delivered was clear: It is important that 
our governments have a sustained dialogue on the role that our BMD systems have in our 
respective defense policies and strategies. We would welcome an opportunity to learn more 
about how BMD fits into China’s defense policy and strategy. 
More broadly, a sustained dialogue would improve our understanding of China’s strategic 
perspective and enhance China’s understanding of U.S. policy and strategy. Institutionalizing 
discussions of strategic issues is a prudent long-term approach to strengthening strategic 
stability and exploring means for strengthening mutual trust and risk reduction. 
To encourage that dialogue, we have taken and will continue to take steps to keep China 
informed about developments in U.S. BMD policy. 
Potential Chinese BMD through the Lens of the U.S. Experience 
The U.S. experience with BMD and specifically with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
System, or GMD, provides a useful lens for examining the challenges the Chinese would 
face in developing a BMD capability to threaten our nuclear deterrent. 
We have been clear that our homeland BMD capabilities provide for defense of the U.S. 
homeland from limited ICBM attack, and are purposely not intended to affect Russia’s or 
China’s strategic deterrent. The GMD system is designed to support that policy, and it is not 
scaled, intended, or capable of defending the United States against the larger and more 
sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China. GMD is designed to protect the U.S. homeland 
only from limited ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran. 
The U.S. experience with BMD suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive 
homeland BMD system to defend against ballistic missile attack from China or Russia would 
be extremely challenging – and costly – given the size and sophistication of Chinese and 
Russian ICBMs. This owes to several factors, including the relatively low number of GMD 
interceptors and the sophistication and large numbers of Russian and Chinese missiles. 
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this publically on May 18, 2010, in 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he said that trying to eliminate 
the viability of the Russian nuclear capability would be “unbelievably expensive.” 
Given these factors, we could potentially expect a notional Chinese equivalent to the GMD 
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system to provide at most a limited defense of the Chinese homeland, which would not 
counter the U.S. strategic deterrent and therefore would not undermine strategic stability. 
This is for the same reason that GMD does not impact strategic stability: the number of 
interceptors is low and they are not designed to deal with complex threats, and developing a 
comprehensive system to cope with a full-scale attack from another nuclear-armed great 
power would be expensive and ultimately unsuccessful. 
Relationship to ASAT Testing 
There is another important aspect of China’s BMD program that bears discussing, which is 
its connection with China’s anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons program. 
On July 23, 2014, the Chinese Government conducted a non-destructive test of a missile 
designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. However, China publicly called this ASAT 
test a “land-based missile interception test.” 
Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test, let me assure you the United States 
has high confidence in its assessment that the event was indeed an ASAT test. 
The continued development and testing of destructive ASAT systems is both destabilizing 
and threatens the long-term security and sustainability of the outer space environment. A 
previous destructive test of the Chinese system in 2007 created thousands of pieces of 
debris, which continue to present an ongoing danger to the space systems—as well as 
astronauts—of all nations, including China. 
The destructive nature of debris-generating weapons has decades-long consequences: they 
can increase the potential for further collisions in the future, which only creates more debris. 
A debris-forming test or attack may only be minutes in duration, but the consequences can 
last for decades. It is for these reasons that the United States believes testing debris-
generating ASAT systems threaten the security, economic well-being, and civil endeavors of 
all nations. 
Space systems and their supporting infrastructures enable a wide range of services, including 
communication; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance; and meteorology, which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific, and 
economic benefits. Other nations recognize these benefits to the United States and seek to 
counter the U.S. strategic advantage by pursuing capabilities to deny or destroy our access to 
space services. 
The use of such ASAT weapons could be escalatory in a crisis. 
China’s ASAT program, and the lack of transparency accompanying it, also impedes bilateral 
space cooperation. While we prefer cooperation, it will by necessity have to be a product of a 
step-by-step approach starting with dialogue, leading to modest CBMs, which might then 
perhaps lead to deeper engagement. However, none of this is possible until China changes 




As many of you know, one of my biggest priorities as Assistant Secretary is to look over the 
horizon a bit and begin to structure our Bureau to address the emerging security challenges 
of the 21st Century. 
For me, that means an increased focus on developing a stable strategic relationship with 
China, while at the same time reassuring our Allies. 
Managing the U.S.-China relationship will take a lot of time and effort, and we won’t always 
be successful. It’s a challenge. But as Secretary Kerry likes to remind us, it’s important for us 
to get caught trying, and that’s what we intend to do. 
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